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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Clark, Ronald Facility: · 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Woodboume CF 
NY SID: 10-096-18 B 
DIN: 93-A-5286 
Appearances: Kathy Manley, Esq. 
26 Dinmore Road 
Selkirk, New Yor~ 12158 
Decision appealed: October 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 
months. · 
Board Member(s) Alexander, Coppola, Davis 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellanfs Briefreceived February 1, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review:· Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan; 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
~firmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
~med _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to __ ............ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed herefo. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ te findings of 
the Parole Board, if any., were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ~·..,,....._·_,P..__.~~-
Distribution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(B) (11/2018) 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Name: Clark, Ronald DIN: 93-A-5286
Facility: Woodbourne CF AC No.: 10-096-18 B
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Appellant challenges the October 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 24-month hold. 
Appellant is serving an aggregate indeterminate term of imprisonment of 25 to 50 years 
after having been convicted by verdict of five violent felonies: (1) Rape 1st; (2) Sodomy 1st; (3) 
Sexual Abuse 1st; (4) Assault 2nd; and (5) Unlawful Imprisonment 1st.  These crimes involved the 
brutal beating, rape, sodomy and robbery of the female victim over a long period of time.   
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary, 
capricious, made in violation of applicable legal authority, and placed too much emphasis on the 
very serious nature of the multiple, violent crimes of conviction; (2) the Board did not provide 
sufficient weight to Appellant’s achievements and release plans, certain scores contained in his 
COMPAS instrument, letters of support, and remorse; (3) the Board should not have considered 
Appellant’s disciplinary record; (4) the Board’s decision was made in violation of Appellant’s due 
process rights; (5) the Board’s decision lacked sufficient detail; and (6) certain issues should have 
been discussed during the interview. 
As to the first and second issues, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely 
as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering 
if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will 
not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 
259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer 
repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their 
application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails 
to satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is an 
independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268; Matter 
of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477.  Thus, it is well 
settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, 
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e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter 
of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each 
factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 
A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17.  In 
the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it 
must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 
914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 
A.D.2d 128. 
In 2011, the law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles 
to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 
§8002.2(a).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter 
of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also 
Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 
2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 
2014).  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a 
case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant 
offense.  The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is 
required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. See Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of 
King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes 
of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  Furthermore, declining to afford 
the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).   
Inasmuch as Appellant disputes the Board’s finding with respect to insight and remorse, it 
was well within the Board’s authority to make an assessment of Appellant’s credibility (Matter of 
Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 108, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1st Dept.), aff’d, 11 N.Y.3d 
777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008)).  Also, the Board is permitted to conclude that the serious nature of 
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the inmate’s offense, as well as limited insight and/or remorse, outweigh other factors.  See, e.g., 
Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000), aff’g 266 A.D.2d 296, 
297, 698 N.Y.S.2d 685, 686 (2d Dept. 1999); Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 
82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 
A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704 
(2017); Matter of Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 
(2d Dept. 2002); Matter of Serrano v. N.Y. State Exec. Dep't-Div. of Parole, 261 A.D.2d 163, 164, 
689 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (1st Dept. 1999). 
  As to the third issue, the Board may consider an inmate’s failure to comply with DOCCS 
rules in denying parole.  See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 
42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 
104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); Matter of Stanley v. New York 
State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 
N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012).  The Board’s consideration of Appellant’s disciplinary 
record at the time of the interview is proper.  The Board is not required to speculate on the outcome 
of a pending appeal on a particular disciplinary ticket received. 
As to the fourth issue, the Supreme Court has held that because a person's liberty interest 
is extinguished upon conviction, there is no inherent right, or right under the U.S. Constitution, to 
parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); 
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).  Likewise, there is no due process right to parole under the 
New York State Constitution. Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1979); Matter of Russo, 
50 N.Y.2d 69; Matter of Freeman v. New York State Division of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174 (3d Dept. 
2005). Thus, the protections of the due process clause do not apply to the Parole Board’s 
determinations as to whether an inmate should be released to parole supervision. Maldonado v. 
Evans, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183163 (W.D.N.Y. 2014); Barrow v. Vanburen, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 181466 (N.D.N.Y. 2014); Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2001).  We recognize, 
however, that while an inmate has no vested right to parole release under the due process clause, 
there is a liberty interest which requires, as a matter of procedural due process, an opportunity to 
be heard, and a statement of the reasons for the denial of release.  Therefore, in deciding whether 
to grant or deny parole, all the Board must do is: (1) afford the inmate an opportunity to be heard, 
and (2) if parole is denied, provide the reasons for the denial. Thurman v. Allard, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18904 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Blackett v. Thomas, 293 F.Supp.2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Gittens 
v. Thomas, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9087 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  Appellant received both of these 
constitutional protections and, therefore, any arguments alleging that the Board’s decision was 
made in violation of the due process clause, and in contravention of a liberty interest arising from 
the due process clause, are without merit. 
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 As to the fifth issue, the Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law §259-
i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the 
reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 
996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 
N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d 
Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983). 
            As to the sixth issue, Appellant was provided the opportunity to discuss with the Board 
during the interview any issues of interest, and cannot now be heard to complain that certain issues 
were not discussed, or the extent to which certain issues were discussed. See Matter of Serna v. 
New York State Division of Parole, 279 A.D.2d 684, 719 N.Y.S. 2d 166  (3d Dept. 2001); Matter 
of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dept. 1997).   
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
